A new member could end up with a Loomio account and a Matrix account and see NOTHING: no forum group, no Space. Three defects: * sync_matrix_space() gated each member on the SPACE's membership, so an account already joined/invited to the Space was skipped for EVERY room. A member whose invite pass was interrupted (or who predates a room added to MATRIX_INVITE_ROOMS later) never received that room — and a restricted child room is invisible until you are invited to it. The gate is now per room, from a single up-front membership snapshot; a room whose membership cannot be read is left alone rather than invited into blindly. * a 429 slept for retry_after_ms (minutes) INSIDE the pass, so a scheduled run could outlive its own tick. A rate limit now ENDS the pass; the next run resumes (every invite is idempotent). * a member sitting in the Loomio group with no loomio_invited_at stamp reads as 'never invited' — the dedupe guard was only as good as the rows it had. The sync now heals the record from the live roster. And the activation window itself: provisioning skips an unactivated account by design, and activation happens later with nobody watching, so the 3x/day sweep was the pickup. New /admin/service-sync + a 5-minute scheduler task fires the same idempotent syncs while any member still awaits an invite (one SELECT when none do), and deliberately is NOT /admin/sweep — it never touches Open Collective, allowance logic or member mail. tests/test_service_invites.py proves the per-room gate, resumable rate limits, the unreadable-room skip, the record heal and the endpoint's idle/run paths.
26 lines
859 B
Docker
26 lines
859 B
Docker
FROM python:3.12-slim
|
|
|
|
WORKDIR /app/code
|
|
|
|
# Install dependencies
|
|
COPY requirements.txt .
|
|
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
|
|
|
|
# Copy app
|
|
COPY app/ ./app/
|
|
COPY sweep.sh /app/code/sweep.sh
|
|
COPY service_sync.sh /app/code/service_sync.sh
|
|
COPY rag_refresh.py /app/code/rag_refresh.py
|
|
COPY metrics_snapshot.py /app/code/metrics_snapshot.py
|
|
RUN chmod +x /app/code/sweep.sh /app/code/service_sync.sh /app/code/rag_refresh.py /app/code/metrics_snapshot.py
|
|
|
|
# Run as root (the base image default). Cloudron's sandboxing (read-only
|
|
# rootfs, AppArmor, dropped capabilities) still applies to root inside the
|
|
# container, and /app/data is mounted as a root-owned volume, so running as
|
|
# root is required for the app to write its SQLite store there.
|
|
RUN mkdir -p /app/data
|
|
|
|
EXPOSE 8000
|
|
|
|
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000"]
|