Commit Graph
24 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
inference-admin c0ef046b0d spend check: read the field LiteLLM actually sends (total_spend), and fail loudly either way
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
The first live run FAILED with api $0.00 over 306 keys against the portal's $935.35.
The disagreement was real, the verdict was right, and the cause was mine: LiteLLM's
/global/spend/keys returns each key's all-time spend as `total_spend`, not `spend`.
A checker that trusts its own parse then reports "the portal is wrong" — the exact
mirror of the failure this check exists to catch, which is why the guard now names
both possibilities when the independent side reads zero against real portal spend.

Parser accepts either field name; a regression test exercises the real function
against a stubbed httpx (the module attribute is stubbed for the other checks, so
the real one is captured at import). 24 checks; all 20 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:43:41 +00:00
inference-admin 1c1fced5ba manifest: pin to 20261113-e2eaa7a
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:42:11 +00:00
inference-admin dac8f2c9ea README: the spend-consistency step
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:41:58 +00:00
inference-admin e2eaa7ae40 spend consistency: the check moves into the portal's sweep
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
The failure this exists for (2026-11-05): the portal's own all-time-spend aggregate
failed SOFT when its copy of the gateway's LiteLLM DB credential went stale — the
query returned nothing, every surface showed $0, and nothing looked wrong, because
the portal WAS the thing that was wrong. The guard ran as a daily script on the
bot's host.

It now runs in the portal, and keeps two genuinely independent reads: the portal's
SpendLogs aggregate over its own DB credential, and LiteLLM's own HTTP API
(/global/spend/keys) over the master key — a different transport AND a different
credential, which is the point, since the DB copy is what goes stale.

It adds the signature guard the host script could only infer from outside: an
EMPTY//usr/bin/bash portal aggregate while LiteLLM reports real spend is a FAILURE, named as
the stale-credential case; an API side that returns no keys is a failure too, not
agreement. A read that cannot be made is skipped — never a clean bill. Silent when
they agree; info@ once per failing episode, marker cleared on recovery.
POST /admin/spend-check runs it on demand. 23 checks; all 20 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:41:27 +00:00
inference-admin bb0a02dcd9 manifest: pin to 20261113-bf1e5f0
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:36:39 +00:00
inference-admin 06e7ae0ea5 README: the unmapped-backer step and the notice policy
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:35:42 +00:00
inference-admin bf1e5f013b unmapped backers: stop the phantom finding (the members query had no createdAt)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
The first production run reported a null-account node as an uncredited payer. The
cause was in my port, not the data: the members query selected id-less,
date-less nodes, so every null-account node fell into the date "" bucket, matched
no same-day order, and was reported as unattributable — while the host-side script
(correctly) said clean.

Two fixes: select id + createdAt in fetch_all_member_nodes, and never emit a
null-account finding when the node carries no date — there is nothing to attribute
it against, and guessing is what produced the phantom. 27 checks in the suite.
2026-11-13 20:35:28 +00:00
inference-admin 13b6131652 notices: tell a human about what is NEW, and only when a notice actually went out
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
Three fixes to the 'email only when there is a problem' rule, found by testing it:

1. The marker recorded the CURRENT set, so a set that SHRANK looked changed — one
   purchase granted dropped out, the remaining hold looked new, and it was mailed
   about twice. What a human has been TOLD is now a growing SET of keys
   (order:grant / order:hold, slug:class for backers): only keys not in it are
   mailed, and the union is stored.
2. A notify=False run advanced the marker, so a verification look CONSUMED the
   only alert a finding gets. The marker now advances only when the notice was
   actually sent (a failed send retries next sweep), and a clean pass clears it so
   a recurrence is news again.
3. The credit reconcile had the same shape of bug.

Tests updated to pin the new semantics: a smaller set re-mails nobody, a silent
look does not swallow the alert, a clean run clears the marker and a recurrence
speaks. 26 + 40 checks in those suites; all 19 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:34:24 +00:00
inference-admin f258a22aa3 manifest: pin to 20261113-eaaabf3
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:31:22 +00:00
inference-admin eaaabf3763 unmapped backers: the paid-but-unprovisioned net moves into the portal
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
A contributor who pays and never gets an account is invisible to the sweep —
fetch_members() drops every member node with no email, and an OC Organization
never exposes one — so they wait until they ask (the mmoya case). The net for them
was a daily script on the bot's host driving `cloudron exec` from outside. The
portal holds both sides of that comparison, so it now owns it.

reconcile_unmapped_backers() runs in the sweep and reports three classes, because
each needs a different human action: an org account (link it), a VISIBLE email
(the sweep should have provisioned this — check the token/sweep), and a hidden
email (fetch it out-of-band). A node with no account object is attributed through
same-day current orders, and stays silent when every same-day payer is mapped.

MAIL POLICY (ntnsndr, 2026-11-13): only when there is a problem — and only when
the finding SET changes, fingerprinted in portal_state (slug+class only, never an
email), so a stuck finding does not mail three times a day while a fresh one
always speaks. A clean run clears the marker. A failed read returns skipped,
never a clean bill.

POST /admin/unmapped-check (X-Admin-Token, ?notify=0 to stay quiet). The
credit-pack reconcile now mails on the same rule. 25 checks; all 19 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:30:46 +00:00
inference-admin d117da3dc6 README: the sweep's webhook-failure report, and why the scraper is gone
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:25:51 +00:00
inference-admin 9f7934121f manifest: pin to 20261113-2e40387
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:25:18 +00:00
inference-admin 2e40387245 webhook failures: the portal records and reports its own, not a scraper on my host
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
The alert for a failed Open Collective delivery lived in portal_webhook_watch.py on
the operator's machine, polling this app's log through the Cloudron API. That put a
money-critical signal outside the system, and on a log buffer with only hours of
memory — during the 2026-11-13 investigation whole hours (06:00-13:00, 15:00) were
simply absent, so 'no failed delivery in the log' could not be distinguished from
'no delivery at all'.

The portal handles every delivery, so the portal now knows: a new webhook_failures
table records every non-2xx (including the 401 that means the URL and WEBHOOK_TOKEN
disagree, whose event type is read from a body cached before the token check), and
webhook_failure_report() in the sweep emails info@ ONCE per new batch via a marker
in the new portal_state table, so a wrong token does not mail every sweep while the
rows stay queryable. The delivery path is unchanged: bookkeeping failures are
logged, never raised, and the response stays 401/503.

19 checks in test_webhook_resilience.py; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:23:33 +00:00
inference-admin 6c82d7d689 manifest: pin to 20261113-c174fa2
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:21:22 +00:00
inference-admin c174fa2ffe reconcile: link a row to its member by slug OR email
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
Both routes are needed. A manual grant often carries no reference at all, so the
row's EMAIL is the only link to its member — and the slug and email local part
routinely differ ('henry-smith' vs 'h.smith@x.org'). The membership test was
slug-first and, when the slug matched neither the reference nor the email, dropped
the row outright: a hand-credited purchase therefore reads as a gap (ntnsndr's
2026-09-28 packs, where the ledger carries +20.00, +5.75 and a -10.75 correction
with no references). _row_belongs_to() accepts either route, in both the
accounted-for test and the nearby-rows context. 38 checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:20:40 +00:00
inference-admin 711371f9d7 manifest: pin to 20261113-f2b6153
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:19:17 +00:00
inference-admin f2b6153aa6 reconcile: show a candidate's nearby ledger rows, so a manual grant isn't read as a gap
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
Widening the window to OC's whole order history found three $5 packs from
2026-09-28 reported as uncredited — ntnsndr's launch-day purchases, which WERE
credited by hand that morning: +20.00, +5.75, then a -10.75 correction ('true
contributions were 3 x $5.00'), netting exactly $15, with no per-order reference
on any row.

credit_pack_accounted() is right not to infer 'accounted for' from a nearby
amount — that would hide genuine gaps — but a reviewer could not tell the two
cases apart from the candidate alone. Each candidate now carries its nearby
ledger/held rows (7-day window, capped at 5) and the report-mode log line prints
them, so a manual grant explains itself. Nothing about the decision changes.

36 checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:18:44 +00:00
inference-admin d69c518b47 manifest: pin to 20261113-5868ca8
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:16:34 +00:00
inference-admin 5868ca82e8 reconcile paid credit packs against the ledger, report-first (issue #7)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
Credits have one path in: the OC order.processed webhook. On 2026-11-13 two paid
packs got nothing through it — a $50 whose delivery 500'd on httpx's 5s default,
and a $10 with no delivery in the retained log at all — and nothing on a
schedule noticed. This adds a pass that reads OC's own order list and compares it
with our books over a day-based window (not "whatever the log still holds": the
$10 gap was 11h old and the log had lost the whole morning).

Report-first: CREDIT_RECONCILE defaults to 'report' (log findings, change
nothing) and grants only when set to 'on'. Grants go through add_credits() with
credit_pack_reference(), the same per-order key the webhook writes, so a late
delivery and this pass are idempotent against each other in both directions. A
buyer with no active membership is reported, never credited — those keep the
hold-and-email path.

credit_pack_accounted() encodes what our own rows actually look like: a v2 id, a
hyphenated legacy id, an empty-suffix legacy reference, and held_credits rows. A
bare oc:<slug>:<order.id> match read 21 credited purchases as missing during
development, so the fallback demands a second signal (member + tip-free amount +
date) before calling an order credited.

POST /admin/credit-pack-reconcile (X-Admin-Token) runs it on demand, dry unless
?apply=1 and the policy is on. 33 new checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:16:24 +00:00
inference-admin 32e744d9ee README: document the webhook error net, the OC timeouts, and the missing reconciliation
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:05:23 +00:00
inference-admin 9c53e5e727 manifest: pin to 20261113-f45e4ef
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:04:53 +00:00
inference-admin f45e4ef305 webhook: stop a transient OC read failure from costing a member credits
On 2026-11-13 an `order.processed` delivery for a $50 credit pack returned 500.
fetch_members() -> fetch_all_member_nodes() used a bare httpx.AsyncClient(), so OC
was given httpx's DEFAULT 5-second timeout; the read timed out, httpx.ReadTimeout
escaped the handler as an unhandled ASGI exception, and the purchase was never
credited. The member paid and got nothing, and the log held a stack trace rather
than anything naming the member or the order.

Three changes, each aimed at a different failure:

* fetch_all_member_nodes: an EXPLICIT 30s timeout, and one retry per page on a
  transport error (`_oc_graphql_post`). Still RAISES when it cannot get the full
  list — the sweep's fail-safes depend on that.
* opencollective_webhook: the work moves to _process_opencollective_webhook and a
  thin wrapper answers 503 (retryable) with an ERROR line naming the exception if
  anything unexpected escapes. A 401 stays a 401; that status is the signal that
  the webhook URL and WEBHOOK_TOKEN disagree, and swallowing it would hide a
  misconfigured webhook.
* tests/test_webhook_resilience.py proves it: 401 preserved, 503 (not 500) on a
  simulated ReadTimeout, credits granted exactly once per OC order, an identical
  re-delivery answering already_credited with no money moved, and the retry/raise
  behaviour of the transport helper.
2026-11-13 20:04:09 +00:00
inference-admin 5705d02792 manifest: pin to 20261113-0e825e6
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 17:38:35 +00:00
inference-admin 0e825e6d61 service invites: per-room Matrix gate, resumable rate limits, Loomio record heal, 5-min sync tick
A new member could end up with a Loomio account and a Matrix account and see
NOTHING: no forum group, no Space. Three defects:

* sync_matrix_space() gated each member on the SPACE's membership, so an
  account already joined/invited to the Space was skipped for EVERY room. A
  member whose invite pass was interrupted (or who predates a room added to
  MATRIX_INVITE_ROOMS later) never received that room — and a restricted child
  room is invisible until you are invited to it. The gate is now per room, from
  a single up-front membership snapshot; a room whose membership cannot be read
  is left alone rather than invited into blindly.
* a 429 slept for retry_after_ms (minutes) INSIDE the pass, so a scheduled run
  could outlive its own tick. A rate limit now ENDS the pass; the next run
  resumes (every invite is idempotent).
* a member sitting in the Loomio group with no loomio_invited_at stamp reads as
  'never invited' — the dedupe guard was only as good as the rows it had. The
  sync now heals the record from the live roster.

And the activation window itself: provisioning skips an unactivated account by
design, and activation happens later with nobody watching, so the 3x/day sweep
was the pickup. New /admin/service-sync + a 5-minute scheduler task fires the
same idempotent syncs while any member still awaits an invite (one SELECT when
none do), and deliberately is NOT /admin/sweep — it never touches Open
Collective, allowance logic or member mail.

tests/test_service_invites.py proves the per-room gate, resumable rate limits,
the unreadable-room skip, the record heal and the endpoint's idle/run paths.
2026-11-13 17:37:57 +00:00