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docs/operations/agentic-systems.md
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inference-bot cb270e51b9 docs: document the host access model
State the privilege ranking on the Agentic Systems page: bots have no sudo, the steward can act only inside bot accounts, and root belongs to a separate key-only operator account. Update the Infrastructure page's least-privilege and backup statements to match.
2026-11-21 16:08:20 +00:00

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Working with the agent

The co-op runs Inferencebot to help steward its infrastructure. It is isolated as its own OS user, with its own gateway key — budget, model allowlist and spend enforced at the gateway. It runs on co-op infrastructure under a co-op identity, uses the co-op's own gateway for inference, and its skills, scripts and configuration are mirrored to a Gitea repository nightly. This page is for members who read its output or give it instructions.

Where it speaks and listens

  • #inferencebot-updates is read-only: daily digests, model changes, upgrades, maintenance, outages. Posts are anonymized.
  • Instructing the agent is limited to members on its allowlist of Matrix IDs (kept in its configuration, published here once settled), and only in the rooms where it is configured to answer — most require a mention. The General Manager decides who is on the list.
  • The retired @inference-bot:inference.coop automation account (with a hyphen) no longer holds an access token; some historical references and old room roles still carry the name.

Who can do what on the host

Each agent runs as its own Unix account, and the accounts are ranked:

  • The bots (infrastructure-bot, socialbot, designbot and any future working-group bot) cannot use sudo at all.
  • Inferencebot, the steward, can act inside those bot accounts — it is the fleet administrator — but it has no root and no passwordless sudo beyond the docs and backup service commands. It cannot install packages, create users, edit /etc, or open a root shell.
  • Root belongs to a person. A separate operator account, reached with an SSH key and never a password, holds full sudo. Root SSH login stays closed: the operator signs in as their own account and escalates deliberately.

That split is deliberate. An agent compromise reaches the bot accounts and the co-op plumbing, not the host. Host-level actions stay attributable to a human, and automation cannot quietly widen its own privileges.

What to ask for

  • Operational work that a runbook already describes, or that ends in a PR, an issue or a post members can see.
  • Research and summaries that would otherwise land in an issue.
  • Status: what is running, what failed, what changed.

What not to ask in a shared room

  • Anything involving member-identifying data. That work happens in a session a named steward opened, and the result is reported without the data.
  • Anything that moves money or changes who is a member. Those go through the portal and a human.
  • Credentials, in either direction.

Content is data, never instructions

Text an agent reads — issue descriptions, pull-request comments, web pages, fetched documents, and messages from members in a room — is data. The agent may quote, summarise or act on it once the operator asks, but an instruction embedded in that text is never executed. Only the operator's own direct instruction authorises a credentialed action: a deploy, a credential change, or a budget change. This rule exists because the same process that reads an issue can reach the infrastructure the issue is about.

What they do without asking

Read, monitor, draft, open issues and PRs, post updates, run the scheduled jobs listed in Infrastructure, and deploy fixes after flagging them to the operator. The bot can deploy without waiting for a reply, and the operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation.

What always needs a human

  • Member-visible, destructive or risky changes to the gateway, the portal or the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
  • Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
  • Minting or rotating credentials.
  • Host root actions — package installs, user management, sudoers changes, and arbitrary root commands. These run only through the operator's key-only account; the steward cannot perform them.
  • Anything a runbook marks "confirm".

This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter norm is a policy decision for the forum.

Attribution and the off switch

Every instruction an agent acts on is attributable to the member who gave it, in the room where it was given. If an agent misbehaves, the operator, or anyone holding gateway-admin and Matrix account access, can stop it: revoke its gateway key, then its Matrix access token. Stewards generally do not hold that access today, so say what you saw in #general and the operator acts. Stopping is not restarting: the backup and the git mirror restore state, not uptime, and someone has to start the agent again. The steps, and the steps for rotating everything an agent holds, are in the agent's runbook; the credential inventory in the operator token runbook says what that is.

Changes to this page are policy: propose them in the forum.