docs: reflect restricted host access, signed key feed, backup versioning, advisory CI
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@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation.
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the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
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the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
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- Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
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- Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
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- Minting or rotating credentials.
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- Minting or rotating credentials.
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- Host root actions outside the docs/backup service allowlist: package installs,
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user management, and arbitrary root commands.
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- Anything a runbook marks "confirm".
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- Anything a runbook marks "confirm".
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This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter
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This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter
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@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data.
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Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in
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Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in
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Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade
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Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade
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or a lost server can be restored. The automation host backs up its own data to
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or a lost server can be restored. The automation host backs up its own data to
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the same object storage.
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the same object storage; its backup credentials are root-only and never held by
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the agent. Bucket versioning is enabled, so a deleted snapshot object remains
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recoverable rather than vanishing.
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### Domain and DNS
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### Domain and DNS
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@@ -215,10 +217,23 @@ private, loopback, and internal addresses. The
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independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope.
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independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope.
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- **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's
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- **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's
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environment, never in the repos.
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environment, never in the repos.
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- **Least-privilege automation.** The steward agent runs as its own Unix user.
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Host root access is limited to a small allowlist of docs and backup service
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commands; package installs, user management and arbitrary root commands need
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the operator.
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- **Backup keys stay outside the agent.** The nightly backup credentials live in
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a root-only file, not the agent's environment.
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- **Machine feeds are signed.** The portal's chat-key feed is reachable only
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from the internal network and requires a timestamped HMAC in addition to its
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sync token.
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- **CI is advisory, not a trust boundary.** Woodpecker runs in a shared root
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container, so its status is visible but does not gate merges; Owners review is
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the gate. The operator docs record the runner-isolation work.
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- **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in
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- **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in
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the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay
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the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay
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publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is
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publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is
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exposed.
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exposed. The automation host's remaining backup-timer root hardening is
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tracked in operator docs.
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## For operators
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## For operators
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