From 5ec2504426b4ba821f31431364ec63ba5652bdd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Inferencebot Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 02:10:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs: reflect restricted host access, signed key feed, backup versioning, advisory CI --- operations/agentic-systems.md | 2 ++ operations/infrastructure.md | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/operations/agentic-systems.md b/operations/agentic-systems.md index ebc965c..aecedfc 100644 --- a/operations/agentic-systems.md +++ b/operations/agentic-systems.md @@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation. the chat: confirmed before they deploy. - Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets. - Minting or rotating credentials. +- Host root actions outside the docs/backup service allowlist: package installs, + user management, and arbitrary root commands. - Anything a runbook marks "confirm". This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter diff --git a/operations/infrastructure.md b/operations/infrastructure.md index 0963d0f..a634677 100644 --- a/operations/infrastructure.md +++ b/operations/infrastructure.md @@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data. Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade or a lost server can be restored. The automation host backs up its own data to -the same object storage. +the same object storage; its backup credentials are root-only and never held by +the agent. Bucket versioning is enabled, so a deleted snapshot object remains +recoverable rather than vanishing. ### Domain and DNS @@ -215,10 +217,23 @@ private, loopback, and internal addresses. The independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope. - **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's environment, never in the repos. +- **Least-privilege automation.** The steward agent runs as its own Unix user. + Host root access is limited to a small allowlist of docs and backup service + commands; package installs, user management and arbitrary root commands need + the operator. +- **Backup keys stay outside the agent.** The nightly backup credentials live in + a root-only file, not the agent's environment. +- **Machine feeds are signed.** The portal's chat-key feed is reachable only + from the internal network and requires a timestamped HMAC in addition to its + sync token. +- **CI is advisory, not a trust boundary.** Woodpecker runs in a shared root + container, so its status is visible but does not gate merges; Owners review is + the gate. The operator docs record the runner-isolation work. - **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is - exposed. + exposed. The automation host's remaining backup-timer root hardening is + tracked in operator docs. ## For operators