Files
member-portal/app
inference-bot 452a27a778 portal: guard against an implausible member list; redact the webhook token from logs
Two fixes, both filed rather than deferred.

1. member-portal#2 — the sweep deactivates every member whose email is missing
   from the Open Collective member list, and the existing fail-safe only covers a
   fetch that RAISES. A fetch that SUCCEEDS while returning nothing or far less
   than usual is unguarded, and is what a narrowed token scope, an expired
   credential with partial access, or a renamed Membership tier produces (the
   fetch filters on the tier's name). That path deactivates the membership
   instead of failing. fetch_members() now checks the result against the local
   active count before any caller can act on it: empty, or at or below half of
   local, raises — so the sweep's fail-safe takes over and members stay active.
   Skipped when we have no active members of our own (fresh install).

   Correction to the issue as filed: listmonk_reconcile reads the local members
   table, not this fetch, so the newsletter path was never exposed to it. The
   sweep is the only destructive consumer.

2. ops/security#2 — OC's generic webhooks cannot send headers, so the webhook
   secret must travel in the URL path, and uvicorn wrote it into the access log
   on every delivery. A logging filter on uvicorn.access and on the root handler
   replaces the token with <redacted>. The token cannot be kept out of the URL;
   it can be kept out of the retention.

Both pieces are unit-tested in isolation before shipping: the guard's decision
function over eight cases, and the filter against a real access-log record, an
unrelated path (no over-redaction), and a missing dependency (must not break
logging).
2026-10-27 05:04:05 +00:00
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