The first live run FAILED with api $0.00 over 306 keys against the portal's $935.35.
The disagreement was real, the verdict was right, and the cause was mine: LiteLLM's
/global/spend/keys returns each key's all-time spend as `total_spend`, not `spend`.
A checker that trusts its own parse then reports "the portal is wrong" — the exact
mirror of the failure this check exists to catch, which is why the guard now names
both possibilities when the independent side reads zero against real portal spend.
Parser accepts either field name; a regression test exercises the real function
against a stubbed httpx (the module attribute is stubbed for the other checks, so
the real one is captured at import). 24 checks; all 20 suites green.
The failure this exists for (2026-11-05): the portal's own all-time-spend aggregate
failed SOFT when its copy of the gateway's LiteLLM DB credential went stale — the
query returned nothing, every surface showed $0, and nothing looked wrong, because
the portal WAS the thing that was wrong. The guard ran as a daily script on the
bot's host.
It now runs in the portal, and keeps two genuinely independent reads: the portal's
SpendLogs aggregate over its own DB credential, and LiteLLM's own HTTP API
(/global/spend/keys) over the master key — a different transport AND a different
credential, which is the point, since the DB copy is what goes stale.
It adds the signature guard the host script could only infer from outside: an
EMPTY//usr/bin/bash portal aggregate while LiteLLM reports real spend is a FAILURE, named as
the stale-credential case; an API side that returns no keys is a failure too, not
agreement. A read that cannot be made is skipped — never a clean bill. Silent when
they agree; info@ once per failing episode, marker cleared on recovery.
POST /admin/spend-check runs it on demand. 23 checks; all 20 suites green.