Commit Graph
300 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
inference-admin 1c1fced5ba manifest: pin to 20261113-e2eaa7a
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:42:11 +00:00
inference-admin dac8f2c9ea README: the spend-consistency step
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:41:58 +00:00
inference-admin e2eaa7ae40 spend consistency: the check moves into the portal's sweep
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
The failure this exists for (2026-11-05): the portal's own all-time-spend aggregate
failed SOFT when its copy of the gateway's LiteLLM DB credential went stale — the
query returned nothing, every surface showed $0, and nothing looked wrong, because
the portal WAS the thing that was wrong. The guard ran as a daily script on the
bot's host.

It now runs in the portal, and keeps two genuinely independent reads: the portal's
SpendLogs aggregate over its own DB credential, and LiteLLM's own HTTP API
(/global/spend/keys) over the master key — a different transport AND a different
credential, which is the point, since the DB copy is what goes stale.

It adds the signature guard the host script could only infer from outside: an
EMPTY//usr/bin/bash portal aggregate while LiteLLM reports real spend is a FAILURE, named as
the stale-credential case; an API side that returns no keys is a failure too, not
agreement. A read that cannot be made is skipped — never a clean bill. Silent when
they agree; info@ once per failing episode, marker cleared on recovery.
POST /admin/spend-check runs it on demand. 23 checks; all 20 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:41:27 +00:00
inference-admin bb0a02dcd9 manifest: pin to 20261113-bf1e5f0
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:36:39 +00:00
inference-admin 06e7ae0ea5 README: the unmapped-backer step and the notice policy
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:35:42 +00:00
inference-admin bf1e5f013b unmapped backers: stop the phantom finding (the members query had no createdAt)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
The first production run reported a null-account node as an uncredited payer. The
cause was in my port, not the data: the members query selected id-less,
date-less nodes, so every null-account node fell into the date "" bucket, matched
no same-day order, and was reported as unattributable — while the host-side script
(correctly) said clean.

Two fixes: select id + createdAt in fetch_all_member_nodes, and never emit a
null-account finding when the node carries no date — there is nothing to attribute
it against, and guessing is what produced the phantom. 27 checks in the suite.
2026-11-13 20:35:28 +00:00
inference-admin 13b6131652 notices: tell a human about what is NEW, and only when a notice actually went out
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
Three fixes to the 'email only when there is a problem' rule, found by testing it:

1. The marker recorded the CURRENT set, so a set that SHRANK looked changed — one
   purchase granted dropped out, the remaining hold looked new, and it was mailed
   about twice. What a human has been TOLD is now a growing SET of keys
   (order:grant / order:hold, slug:class for backers): only keys not in it are
   mailed, and the union is stored.
2. A notify=False run advanced the marker, so a verification look CONSUMED the
   only alert a finding gets. The marker now advances only when the notice was
   actually sent (a failed send retries next sweep), and a clean pass clears it so
   a recurrence is news again.
3. The credit reconcile had the same shape of bug.

Tests updated to pin the new semantics: a smaller set re-mails nobody, a silent
look does not swallow the alert, a clean run clears the marker and a recurrence
speaks. 26 + 40 checks in those suites; all 19 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:34:24 +00:00
inference-admin f258a22aa3 manifest: pin to 20261113-eaaabf3
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:31:22 +00:00
inference-admin eaaabf3763 unmapped backers: the paid-but-unprovisioned net moves into the portal
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
A contributor who pays and never gets an account is invisible to the sweep —
fetch_members() drops every member node with no email, and an OC Organization
never exposes one — so they wait until they ask (the mmoya case). The net for them
was a daily script on the bot's host driving `cloudron exec` from outside. The
portal holds both sides of that comparison, so it now owns it.

reconcile_unmapped_backers() runs in the sweep and reports three classes, because
each needs a different human action: an org account (link it), a VISIBLE email
(the sweep should have provisioned this — check the token/sweep), and a hidden
email (fetch it out-of-band). A node with no account object is attributed through
same-day current orders, and stays silent when every same-day payer is mapped.

MAIL POLICY (ntnsndr, 2026-11-13): only when there is a problem — and only when
the finding SET changes, fingerprinted in portal_state (slug+class only, never an
email), so a stuck finding does not mail three times a day while a fresh one
always speaks. A clean run clears the marker. A failed read returns skipped,
never a clean bill.

POST /admin/unmapped-check (X-Admin-Token, ?notify=0 to stay quiet). The
credit-pack reconcile now mails on the same rule. 25 checks; all 19 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:30:46 +00:00
inference-admin d117da3dc6 README: the sweep's webhook-failure report, and why the scraper is gone
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:25:51 +00:00
inference-admin 9f7934121f manifest: pin to 20261113-2e40387
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:25:18 +00:00
inference-admin 2e40387245 webhook failures: the portal records and reports its own, not a scraper on my host
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
The alert for a failed Open Collective delivery lived in portal_webhook_watch.py on
the operator's machine, polling this app's log through the Cloudron API. That put a
money-critical signal outside the system, and on a log buffer with only hours of
memory — during the 2026-11-13 investigation whole hours (06:00-13:00, 15:00) were
simply absent, so 'no failed delivery in the log' could not be distinguished from
'no delivery at all'.

The portal handles every delivery, so the portal now knows: a new webhook_failures
table records every non-2xx (including the 401 that means the URL and WEBHOOK_TOKEN
disagree, whose event type is read from a body cached before the token check), and
webhook_failure_report() in the sweep emails info@ ONCE per new batch via a marker
in the new portal_state table, so a wrong token does not mail every sweep while the
rows stay queryable. The delivery path is unchanged: bookkeeping failures are
logged, never raised, and the response stays 401/503.

19 checks in test_webhook_resilience.py; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:23:33 +00:00
inference-admin 6c82d7d689 manifest: pin to 20261113-c174fa2
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:21:22 +00:00
inference-admin c174fa2ffe reconcile: link a row to its member by slug OR email
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
Both routes are needed. A manual grant often carries no reference at all, so the
row's EMAIL is the only link to its member — and the slug and email local part
routinely differ ('henry-smith' vs 'h.smith@x.org'). The membership test was
slug-first and, when the slug matched neither the reference nor the email, dropped
the row outright: a hand-credited purchase therefore reads as a gap (ntnsndr's
2026-09-28 packs, where the ledger carries +20.00, +5.75 and a -10.75 correction
with no references). _row_belongs_to() accepts either route, in both the
accounted-for test and the nearby-rows context. 38 checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:20:40 +00:00
inference-admin 711371f9d7 manifest: pin to 20261113-f2b6153
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:19:17 +00:00
inference-admin f2b6153aa6 reconcile: show a candidate's nearby ledger rows, so a manual grant isn't read as a gap
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
Widening the window to OC's whole order history found three $5 packs from
2026-09-28 reported as uncredited — ntnsndr's launch-day purchases, which WERE
credited by hand that morning: +20.00, +5.75, then a -10.75 correction ('true
contributions were 3 x $5.00'), netting exactly $15, with no per-order reference
on any row.

credit_pack_accounted() is right not to infer 'accounted for' from a nearby
amount — that would hide genuine gaps — but a reviewer could not tell the two
cases apart from the candidate alone. Each candidate now carries its nearby
ledger/held rows (7-day window, capped at 5) and the report-mode log line prints
them, so a manual grant explains itself. Nothing about the decision changes.

36 checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:18:44 +00:00
inference-admin d69c518b47 manifest: pin to 20261113-5868ca8
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:16:34 +00:00
inference-admin 5868ca82e8 reconcile paid credit packs against the ledger, report-first (issue #7)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
Credits have one path in: the OC order.processed webhook. On 2026-11-13 two paid
packs got nothing through it — a $50 whose delivery 500'd on httpx's 5s default,
and a $10 with no delivery in the retained log at all — and nothing on a
schedule noticed. This adds a pass that reads OC's own order list and compares it
with our books over a day-based window (not "whatever the log still holds": the
$10 gap was 11h old and the log had lost the whole morning).

Report-first: CREDIT_RECONCILE defaults to 'report' (log findings, change
nothing) and grants only when set to 'on'. Grants go through add_credits() with
credit_pack_reference(), the same per-order key the webhook writes, so a late
delivery and this pass are idempotent against each other in both directions. A
buyer with no active membership is reported, never credited — those keep the
hold-and-email path.

credit_pack_accounted() encodes what our own rows actually look like: a v2 id, a
hyphenated legacy id, an empty-suffix legacy reference, and held_credits rows. A
bare oc:<slug>:<order.id> match read 21 credited purchases as missing during
development, so the fallback demands a second signal (member + tip-free amount +
date) before calling an order credited.

POST /admin/credit-pack-reconcile (X-Admin-Token) runs it on demand, dry unless
?apply=1 and the policy is on. 33 new checks; all 18 suites green.
2026-11-13 20:16:24 +00:00
inference-admin 32e744d9ee README: document the webhook error net, the OC timeouts, and the missing reconciliation
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 20:05:23 +00:00
inference-admin 9c53e5e727 manifest: pin to 20261113-f45e4ef
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was canceled
2026-11-13 20:04:53 +00:00
inference-admin f45e4ef305 webhook: stop a transient OC read failure from costing a member credits
On 2026-11-13 an `order.processed` delivery for a $50 credit pack returned 500.
fetch_members() -> fetch_all_member_nodes() used a bare httpx.AsyncClient(), so OC
was given httpx's DEFAULT 5-second timeout; the read timed out, httpx.ReadTimeout
escaped the handler as an unhandled ASGI exception, and the purchase was never
credited. The member paid and got nothing, and the log held a stack trace rather
than anything naming the member or the order.

Three changes, each aimed at a different failure:

* fetch_all_member_nodes: an EXPLICIT 30s timeout, and one retry per page on a
  transport error (`_oc_graphql_post`). Still RAISES when it cannot get the full
  list — the sweep's fail-safes depend on that.
* opencollective_webhook: the work moves to _process_opencollective_webhook and a
  thin wrapper answers 503 (retryable) with an ERROR line naming the exception if
  anything unexpected escapes. A 401 stays a 401; that status is the signal that
  the webhook URL and WEBHOOK_TOKEN disagree, and swallowing it would hide a
  misconfigured webhook.
* tests/test_webhook_resilience.py proves it: 401 preserved, 503 (not 500) on a
  simulated ReadTimeout, credits granted exactly once per OC order, an identical
  re-delivery answering already_credited with no money moved, and the retry/raise
  behaviour of the transport helper.
2026-11-13 20:04:09 +00:00
inference-admin 5705d02792 manifest: pin to 20261113-0e825e6
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 17:38:35 +00:00
inference-admin 0e825e6d61 service invites: per-room Matrix gate, resumable rate limits, Loomio record heal, 5-min sync tick
A new member could end up with a Loomio account and a Matrix account and see
NOTHING: no forum group, no Space. Three defects:

* sync_matrix_space() gated each member on the SPACE's membership, so an
  account already joined/invited to the Space was skipped for EVERY room. A
  member whose invite pass was interrupted (or who predates a room added to
  MATRIX_INVITE_ROOMS later) never received that room — and a restricted child
  room is invisible until you are invited to it. The gate is now per room, from
  a single up-front membership snapshot; a room whose membership cannot be read
  is left alone rather than invited into blindly.
* a 429 slept for retry_after_ms (minutes) INSIDE the pass, so a scheduled run
  could outlive its own tick. A rate limit now ENDS the pass; the next run
  resumes (every invite is idempotent).
* a member sitting in the Loomio group with no loomio_invited_at stamp reads as
  'never invited' — the dedupe guard was only as good as the rows it had. The
  sync now heals the record from the live roster.

And the activation window itself: provisioning skips an unactivated account by
design, and activation happens later with nobody watching, so the 3x/day sweep
was the pickup. New /admin/service-sync + a 5-minute scheduler task fires the
same idempotent syncs while any member still awaits an invite (one SELECT when
none do), and deliberately is NOT /admin/sweep — it never touches Open
Collective, allowance logic or member mail.

tests/test_service_invites.py proves the per-room gate, resumable rate limits,
the unreadable-room skip, the record heal and the endpoint's idle/run paths.
2026-11-13 17:37:57 +00:00
inference-bot de0f5c13c4 manifest: pin to 20261113-3c64b15
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 16:12:45 +00:00
inference-bot 3c64b150db broker: per-member daily usage series in /broker/usage (daily: day/spend/requests)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
The member dashboard's usage chart reads per-day spend + requests for the
signed-in member, bounded by the existing days param (0 = all time, the
unchanged default). Same source and day convention as the co-op daily series
(to_char(startTime)); interior zero days are explicit so chart spacing is
true; requests excludes failed attempts; spend sums every row. Additive and
backward compatible: every existing field untouched. Tested in
tests/test_broker_usage_daily.py (route table, SQL shape, fallback twin,
fail-soft degradation).
2026-11-13 16:11:16 +00:00
inference-bot afffd52dec manifest: pin to 20261113-cad5897
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-13 04:04:45 +00:00
inference-bot cad5897e9a metrics: self-heal missing OC balance days from the OC ledger
The 2026-11-12 hole was NOT a missed sample: the 03:15 run recorded
oc_balance_usd=1357.39, and the evening repair backfill's full-row
upsert of the then-current day — whose dict carries no balance key —
nulled it on conflict. Nothing ever revisited a day's balance, so the
hole was permanent.

Two fixes:
- upsert() can no longer erase a balance it did not measure: the
  conflict clause COALESCEs, so a NULL (a failed OC read) keeps the
  previously recorded value.
- the nightly snapshot heals any recent day (within a week, after the
  series' first recorded balance) whose balance is missing: the value is
  reconstructed from Open Collective's transaction ledger
  (balance(cutoff) = current - net flow after the 03:15 sample moment,
  ledger window clamped to the balance read), matching the daily sample
  semantics exactly. It is written balance-column-only, so membership
  and usage series are untouched. Days before 2026-11-08 stay NULL by
  design. Fail-soft: an OC failure prints and retries next night.

The reconstruction was verified to the cent against OC's own ledger:
full-ledger signed sum == stats.balance (1470.44 on 2026-11-13), and
1470.44 - 113.05 (net flow 2026-11-12 03:15 -> 2026-11-13 03:15:58)
== 1357.39, exactly the sample the 03:15 run had recorded.
2026-11-13 04:04:43 +00:00
inference-bot 8405fd9157 manifest: pin to 20261112-cf3dbb7
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-12 18:41:20 +00:00
inference-bot cf3dbb7489 metrics: complete YESTERDAY's row at 03:15 — every day was frozen at its first ~3 hours
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
snapshot() fetched the full spend window (since = yesterday) but kept only
spend.get(TODAY): the day's first hours, written at 03:15 and never revisited.
Every metrics_daily row after the last backfill under-counted its day by the
hours after 03:15 (Nov 7 recorded $2.19/691 requests against a true
$29.06/3384). The completed day's aggregates were computed and thrown away.

Now each run completes the day that just ENDED — full-day spend, requests,
tokens and impact, written to the usage columns only (upsert_usage: membership
columns are point-in-time measurements and are never rewritten) — and then
records today's live partial as before.

backfill() gains --since YYYY-MM-DD: a targeted usage-only repair that cannot
touch the published membership curve.

Regression test: tests/test_metrics_completion.py (day completion, membership
preservation, since-mode repair boundaries, full-backfill parity).
2026-11-12 18:40:31 +00:00
inference-bot 022e193cc2 manifest: pin to 20261111-58214be0
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-11 05:16:23 +00:00
inference-bot 58214be0db Guest state: the overview payload carries the definitive display state
Single derivation point (tested once, here): 'invited' while the Cloudron
invite is unaccepted, else the guests-ledger status (the record of record),
membership state only as a no-ledger-row fallback. The panel and dashboard
become pure consumers of `state` — their local invited/active derivation
goes away in their own repos next. Live-behaviour note: today's four live
guests render byte-identically; the change only shows for ended guests
(ledger 'expired' instead of the bare inactive flag), which is what the
panel already displayed via its own guest_status preference.
2026-11-11 05:16:13 +00:00
inference-bot 62a59477c6 ci: Woodpecker pipeline runs the 12 test suites on push (gates merges)
ci/woodpecker/push/woodpecker Pipeline was successful
2026-11-11 03:42:00 +00:00
inference-bot 9494ed6d0c manifest: pin to 20261108-2954fe60 2026-11-08 20:54:35 +00:00
inference-bot 2954fe609f Guest invite: serialize member invites — parallel direct calls can't slip two guests
The one-per-30-days rule is a READ of the guests ledger, provisioning
takes seconds of external calls, and the ledger row that closes the
window is written LAST — so two PARALLEL direct calls (curl, bypassing
the dashboard JS) could both pass guest_request_guard before either row
exists and slip two guests past the rule. The member invite path now
runs guard+provision under _GUEST_INVITE_LOCK (single-process uvicorn),
making check-and-send atomic: the second caller re-runs the guard after
the first caller's ledger row exists and is refused 429.

tests/test_guest_concurrency.py proves both halves on the fixture DB:
unguarded, two parallel invites both provision (the test has teeth);
with the lock, exactly one provisions, one is refused 429, one ledger
row, one account, one email; sequential semantics unchanged.
2026-11-08 20:53:54 +00:00
Inferencebot 1d102a4754 manifest: pin to 20261108-88ca8bf 2026-11-08 20:42:00 +00:00
Inferencebot 88ca8bfe18 Guest state: provisioned-but-not-set-up reads 'invited', never 'active'
A guest invitation provisions immediately, but the Cloudron account is not
ACCEPTED until the guest clicks the setup link (inviteAccepted=false, no
username) — until then they cannot log in, so no surface may read them as
active. guest_invite_pending() derives it from the same Cloudron signal the
overview's activated flag uses; unseen-record (users fetch failed) is never
pending, so the state falls back instead of asserting what the data does
not show.

/admin/overview: guest rows report state='invited' with an 'awaiting
setup' reason (invite date named when the ledger has it); /broker/guests
trail entries carry state='invited' the same way, status stays the ledger
record of record. Display/state semantics only — access rules, the $2 cap
and the expiry box are unchanged.

Tests: new test_guest_invited_state.py (derivation, overview flip,
fetch-failure fallback, member rows untouched, trail state);
test_guest_requests.py gains the trail invited/accepted assertions and a
constructible-but-loud fake client so the stubbed users fetch runs.
2026-11-08 20:40:23 +00:00
inference-bot f592e5b7b5 manifest: pin to 20261108-285aa66 2026-11-08 20:21:53 +00:00
inference-bot 285aa66525 Guest invites provision immediately: remove the member approval gate
Operator decision 2026-11-08: the remaining protections (active member,
1 guest per inviter per rolling 30 days, one guest per recipient ever,
no existing portal row, MANUAL_MEMBERS refusal, the $2 cap and the
GUEST_DAYS box) are sufficient without the approval step.

* POST /broker/guests provisions through provision_guest_member at once —
  no pending state; no guest_requests row is ever written.
* GUEST_AUTO_APPROVE flag removed (the live env never carried it).
* guest_request_guard keeps the member-path rules and drops the
  trial-era pending-request checks; the 30-day window is counted from
  the guests ledger.
* GET /admin/guest-requests + approve/reject removed; GET /admin/guest-ledger
  serves the panel's duplicate-send guard.
* The member trail keeps legacy rejected requests as history only.

Built on the sibling $2-cap commit 6be8e2d.
2026-11-08 20:20:30 +00:00
inference-bot f1a86d9d76 manifest: pin to 20261108-6be8e2d 2026-11-08 20:12:53 +00:00
inference-bot 6be8e2d632 Guest cap $5 -> $2: GUEST_BUDGET default, emails, docs, tests 2026-11-08 20:12:47 +00:00
Inferencebot 0f12c63f5e manifest: pin to 20261108-6f5e479 2026-11-08 05:14:11 +00:00
Inferencebot 6f5e479900 Guest invitation email: drop the renewable-energy claim, state sliding-scale pricing
Operator edits:
- The co-op is described only as a member-governed AI cooperative; the
  renewable-energy claim is removed (not all providers are renewable).
- Membership pitch now states the pricing exactly: pay on a sliding
  scale, $15/month allowance plus optional credit packs, plus a say in
  how it's run.
2026-11-08 05:13:52 +00:00
inference-bot 3493227880 manifest: pin to 20261108-ed50031 2026-11-08 03:12:38 +00:00
inference-bot ed50031663 Admin guest invites: admin inviter, no member cap, no name guessing
The admin panel's /admin/provision-guest now takes ONE field (the guest's
email): no name is collected and none is derived from the email — the
guest chooses their own display name and username during Cloudron account
setup, and the invitation email greets neutrally when no name is known.
The guests ledger records the co-op's ADMIN account (ADMIN_INVITER_EMAIL,
default info@inference.coop) as the inviter. Admin invites provision
immediately (the operator IS the approver) and are not bound by the
member's one-per-30-days cap; recipient-side guards (one guest per
recipient ever, no existing portal row) still run. The member paths
(broker invite, request approval) keep every protection and likewise pass
no derived name.
2026-11-08 02:55:10 +00:00
inference-bot 7a63b3a728 README: document the member self-serve guest flow and the trial gate 2026-11-08 02:53:00 +00:00
inference-bot 6220812e08 manifest: pin to 20261108-0293d66 2026-11-08 02:45:40 +00:00
inference-bot 0293d66c1e Member self-serve guest invitations with a trial approval gate
POST /broker/guests (member broker identity — guests cannot reach it) creates
a guest REQUEST; GET /broker/guests returns the member's invitation allowance
(rolling one-per-30-days, counting pending + approved requests) and their own
guest trail. guest_request_guard enforces every existing protection plus the
member-side ones: recipient never an existing member, a prior guest, a pending
request, or a MANUAL_MEMBERS address; the inviter's window counts requests too.

Trial gate (GUEST_AUTO_APPROVE, default off): requests land PENDING in the new
guest_requests table; the operator approves or rejects them via
GET/POST /admin/guest-requests (X-Admin-Token). Approval fires the full
provision_guest_member pipeline (Cloudron user, $5 credit, GUEST_DAYS box,
invitation email naming the inviter, newsletter, ledger row); a guard refusal
at approve-time is recorded on the request and surfaced. The member sees
pending/not-approved status in their own trail — the recipient is contacted
only on approval. With the flag on, a member's request provisions
immediately, no code change needed.

38-check fixture suite (tests/test_guest_requests.py) proves the gate, every
refusal path, the approve/reject actions and auto-approve with the network
replaced by a raising guard.
2026-11-08 02:42:56 +00:00
inference-bot 93184b6011 Fix the gift→guest rename migration for legacy databases
Two defects found by booting the renamed app against a fixture of the
pre-rename database (the live portal's exact state):

1. members.gift_expires_at: the RENAME above uses the stale
   snapshot, so the plain
   below fired right after a successful rename and crashed boot with
   'duplicate column name' — the portal would have failed its deploy
   health check on the live database. Make the two branches exclusive.

2. The ledger's own expiry column: ALTER TABLE guests RENAME moved the
   table but kept its legacy gift_expires_at column, which the provision
   INSERT (writing guest_expires_at) would fail on at first use. Rename
   the column with the table.

Also moves the credit-ledger dedupe references ('gift:<email>' /
'gift-return:<email>') to their guest prefixes at boot — returns first,
since 'gift-return:…' also matches 'gift:%' — so a re-grant after the
rename cannot double-credit.

Verified: migration harness 10/10 on a legacy-state fixture (renames,
value conversion, ref migration, idempotent second boot, readback
helpers); full portal suite 9/9 files green.
2026-11-08 02:42:53 +00:00
inference-bot 27f9cc06b2 Rename gift to guest throughout: routes, ledger table, account_type values, env names, emails, tests
Pure rename, no behaviour change, matching the renamed panel and dashboard
builds. Includes one-time idempotent migrations for existing databases
(gifts->guests table, gift_expires_at->guest_expires_at column,
account_type 'gift'->'guest' values, gift_lapse_notices->guest_lapse_notices)
and four transitional alias routes (admin/provision-gift, admin/gift-convert,
broker/gift-status, broker/cancel-gift) so pre-rename dashboard/panel builds
keep working until they are redeployed.
2026-11-08 02:41:05 +00:00
inference-bot 8af8e39c0b README: document the gift self-cancel flow and GUESTS_ENDED_GROUP_ID 2026-11-08 02:34:13 +00:00