Support OpenWebUI: verify X-OpenWebUI-User-Jwt (HS256) or fall back to X-User-Email + portal secret

app/main.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import sqlite3
 import secrets
 
 import httpx
+import jwt
 from fastapi import FastAPI, Request, Response, HTTPException
 from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
 
@@ -35,11 +36,18 @@ LITELLM_BASE = os.environ.get("LITELLM_BASE", "https://gateway.inference.coop")
 LITELLM_MASTER_KEY = os.environ.get("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY", "")
 OPENCOLLECTIVE_SECRET = os.environ.get("OPENCOLLECTIVE_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
 
-# Shared secret that LibreChat sends as a header on every request, so the
+# Shared secret that the chat frontend uses to authenticate requests to the
-# portal can verify the request genuinely came through LibreChat (which is
+# portal. LibreChat sends it as an X-Portal-Secret header; OpenWebUI signs the
-# behind Cloudron SSO) rather than a direct, spoofed request.
+# user's email as a JWT (see FORWARD_USER_INFO_HEADER_JWT_SECRET below).
 PORTAL_SECRET = os.environ.get("PORTAL_SECRET", "")
 
+# OpenWebUI can sign the forwarded user identity as a JWT using this shared
+# secret. When set, the portal verifies the JWT (HS256) to confirm the email
+# genuinely came from OpenWebUI (behind Cloudron SSO) rather than a spoofed
+# header. This is stronger than the plain X-Portal-Secret header because the
+# email itself is tamper-proof.
+OWUI_JWT_SECRET = os.environ.get("OWUI_JWT_SECRET", "")
+
 # Secret token required in the Open Collective webhook URL path. Open
 # Collective's generic webhooks are not HMAC-signed, so a secret in the URL
 # is the standard way to authenticate them.
@@ -497,13 +505,32 @@ async def list_models():
 @app.api_route("/v1/{path:path}", methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"])
 async def inject_key(request: Request, path: str):
     """Read the member's email from a header, inject their key, forward to LiteLLM."""
-    # Verify the request came through LibreChat (shared secret), so a direct
+    # Verify the request came through the chat frontend, so a direct caller
-    # caller can't spoof the X-User-Email header and use another member's key.
+    # can't spoof the user-email header and use another member's key.
-    _verify_portal_secret(request)
+    #
+    # Two supported auth paths:
+    #   1. OpenWebUI signs the user identity as a JWT (X-OpenWebUI-User-Jwt)
+    #      with a shared secret — the email is tamper-proof, so no separate
+    #      secret header is needed.
+    #   2. LibreChat sends a plain X-User-Email header plus an X-Portal-Secret
+    #      shared-secret header.
+    email = ""
+    jwt_header = request.headers.get("x-openwebui-user-jwt", "")
+    if jwt_header and OWUI_JWT_SECRET:
+        try:
+            claims = jwt.decode(jwt_header, OWUI_JWT_SECRET, algorithms=["HS256"])
+            email = claims.get("email", "")
+        except jwt.PyJWTError:
+            raise HTTPException(401, "Invalid user identity token")
+    else:
+        _verify_portal_secret(request)
+        email = (
+            request.headers.get("x-user-email", "")
+            or request.headers.get("x-openwebui-user-email", "")
+        )
 
-    email = request.headers.get("x-user-email", "")
     if not email:
-        raise HTTPException(401, "No member identity (x-user-email header)")
+        raise HTTPException(401, "No member identity (user-email header)")
 
     # Look up the member's key from the persistent store
     member_key = get_member_key(email)

requirements.txt

@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ fastapi==0.115.0
 uvicorn[standard]==0.30.6
 httpx==0.27.2
 pydantic==2.9.2
+PyJWT==2.9.0