Toward the next governance model #9

New Issue

2026-09-30T19:23:05Z

ntnsndr commented

2026-09-30 19:23:05 +00:00

What's the idea?

With 34 current members, we are approaching the 50-member threshold for transitioning to a democratic governance model.

Why does it matter?

We are a co-op, time to practice it!

Who is it for?

All members

How might it work?

Add ideas below!

## What's the idea? With 34 current members, we are approaching the 50-member threshold for transitioning to a democratic governance model. ## Why does it matter? We are a co-op, time to practice it! ## Who is it for? All members ## How might it work? Add ideas below!

ntnsndr commented

2026-09-30 19:27:24 +00:00

Centralized approach: (closest to current practice)

Retain managing director, which members can vote to replace
Allow member proposals, which MD must respond to at a certain threshold, but non-binding

Board approach: (conventional co-op model)

Establish a board, elected by members, who can hire and fire MD

Horizontalist approach: (similar to Social.coop)

Replace MD with voluntary member committees

**Centralized approach:** (closest to current practice) * Retain managing director, which members can vote to replace * Allow member proposals, which MD must respond to at a certain threshold, but non-binding **Board approach:** (conventional co-op model) * Establish a board, elected by members, who can hire and fire MD **Horizontalist approach:** (similar to Social.coop) * Replace MD with voluntary member committees

inference-bot commented

2026-09-30 19:29:12 +00:00

Some potential directions to react to — each with a trade-off. These are starting points for discussion, not a menu to pick one from; elements can combine.

1. Consensus-in-Loomio (evolution of current practice)
Keep informal consensus for routine decisions; require a Loomio proposal with a supermajority (e.g. 66–75%) for significant ones (pricing, providers, governance changes itself). Define "significant" by a threshold list the members can amend.

Pro: lowest friction, matches how we already work. Con: "significant" is a judgment call; supermajorities can bottleneck.

2. Consent-based (sociocracy-style)
Decisions pass unless a member raises a reasoned objection ("safe to try"). Circles (e.g. tech, membership, outreach) hold their own domains; a general circle coordinates.

Pro: fast, avoids majority-vs-minority framing, scales well. Con: requires facilitation practice and clear domain boundaries.

3. Elected steward(s) + open assembly
Members elect one or more stewards for fixed terms (e.g. 6 months, renewable once) who handle day-to-day operational calls; big decisions stay with the assembly. Full transparency via the forum and open books.

Pro: clear accountability, avoids decision fatigue across 50+ members. Con: concentration risk; needs real term limits and recall.

4. Delegated/liquid fragments
Members can vote directly on any proposal or delegate their vote to a trusted member per topic area (Loomio supports proxies; liquid-style tooling exists if needed).

Pro: participation scales with interest; expertise flows to where it matters. Con: tooling and delegation churn.

5. Weighted or tiered participation
All members vote, but with weights (e.g. by tenure, or by contribution level). Careful: this cuts against our flat sliding-scale ethos and could create classes of membership — listed mainly so we consciously reject or adapt it.

Pro: rewards commitment. Con: contradicts "one member, one voice"; probably not us.

Two structural notes regardless of model:

Threshold mechanics at 50: at 50 members, synchronous consensus becomes impractical — some combination of async Loomio voting + defined quorum (e.g. 30% participation for ordinary proposals, higher for governance changes) is worth writing down early.
Constitutional vs ordinary decisions: worth distinguishing now — a small supermajority (e.g. 75%) for changes to the governance model itself, ordinary rules for everything else. This protects whichever model we adopt from casual reversal.

Some potential directions to react to — each with a trade-off. These are starting points for discussion, not a menu to pick one from; elements can combine. **1. Consensus-in-Loomio (evolution of current practice)** Keep informal consensus for routine decisions; require a Loomio proposal with a supermajority (e.g. 66–75%) for significant ones (pricing, providers, governance changes itself). Define "significant" by a threshold list the members can amend. - *Pro:* lowest friction, matches how we already work. *Con:* "significant" is a judgment call; supermajorities can bottleneck. **2. Consent-based (sociocracy-style)** Decisions pass unless a member raises a reasoned objection ("safe to try"). Circles (e.g. tech, membership, outreach) hold their own domains; a general circle coordinates. - *Pro:* fast, avoids majority-vs-minority framing, scales well. *Con:* requires facilitation practice and clear domain boundaries. **3. Elected steward(s) + open assembly** Members elect one or more stewards for fixed terms (e.g. 6 months, renewable once) who handle day-to-day operational calls; big decisions stay with the assembly. Full transparency via the forum and open books. - *Pro:* clear accountability, avoids decision fatigue across 50+ members. *Con:* concentration risk; needs real term limits and recall. **4. Delegated/liquid fragments** Members can vote directly on any proposal *or* delegate their vote to a trusted member per topic area (Loomio supports proxies; liquid-style tooling exists if needed). - *Pro:* participation scales with interest; expertise flows to where it matters. *Con:* tooling and delegation churn. **5. Weighted or tiered participation** All members vote, but with weights (e.g. by tenure, or by contribution level). Careful: this cuts against our flat sliding-scale ethos and could create classes of membership — listed mainly so we consciously reject or adapt it. - *Pro:* rewards commitment. *Con:* contradicts "one member, one voice"; probably not us. **Two structural notes regardless of model:** - **Threshold mechanics at 50:** at 50 members, synchronous consensus becomes impractical — some combination of async Loomio voting + defined quorum (e.g. 30% participation for ordinary proposals, higher for governance changes) is worth writing down early. - **Constitutional vs ordinary decisions:** worth distinguishing now — a small supermajority (e.g. 75%) for changes to the governance model itself, ordinary rules for everything else. This protects whichever model we adopt from casual reversal.

ntnsndr commented

2026-10-02 14:13:51 +00:00

Initial drafting from Dani:

Here is an early draft of those policies you were asking for:

# Interim governance policies for our first 50 members

I propose we adopt these interim policies while [Inference.coop](http://inference.coop/) has fewer than 50 members. This is not a legal document. Bylaws are separate.

## Membership

- Members are people who pay dues. If dues lapse membership ends unless there is a special dispensation.

- Institutions give us resources and get special access and credibility in return. They do not vote.

## Decisions

- Any member can propose a decision. It stays open for 14 days. If nobody objects it becomes policy.

- One objection stops a proposal. The proposer can revise it and try again.

- An important issue that fails three times can go to a vote that needs 3/4 of all core members. The conflict group first decides whether the issue is worth the cost to our culture.

- Nathan can veto any decision until we reach 50 members.

- Tooling decisions use this same process.

## Conflict

- Conflicts are managed, not resolved. People try to work it out directly first.

- A conflict group of up to 7 facilitators and conflict specialists, ideally including an attorney, helps when that fails and writes a management plan.

- Removing a member takes a proposal from the conflict group, ratified by 14 day lazy consensus. The member facing removal cannot block it. If someone else objects it goes to a 3/4 vote.

- If safety is an issue the conflict group can make a preliminary removal.

- Conflict group members rotate every 6 months, recuse themselves when they have a conflict of interest and can be recalled.

- Joining the conflict group or a higher level working group needs consent from everyone already in it through a 14 day lazy consensus.

## Values

Our shared values are still an open question. We will hold a workshop to align on them within the first two months.

## How this passes

This takes effect if nobody objects within 14 days. The full draft and the list of open questions are here: [link]

Initial drafting from Dani: ``` Here is an early draft of those policies you were asking for: # Interim governance policies for our first 50 members I propose we adopt these interim policies while [Inference.coop](http://inference.coop/) has fewer than 50 members. This is not a legal document. Bylaws are separate. ## Membership - Members are people who pay dues. If dues lapse membership ends unless there is a special dispensation. - Institutions give us resources and get special access and credibility in return. They do not vote. ## Decisions - Any member can propose a decision. It stays open for 14 days. If nobody objects it becomes policy. - One objection stops a proposal. The proposer can revise it and try again. - An important issue that fails three times can go to a vote that needs 3/4 of all core members. The conflict group first decides whether the issue is worth the cost to our culture. - Nathan can veto any decision until we reach 50 members. - Tooling decisions use this same process. ## Conflict - Conflicts are managed, not resolved. People try to work it out directly first. - A conflict group of up to 7 facilitators and conflict specialists, ideally including an attorney, helps when that fails and writes a management plan. - Removing a member takes a proposal from the conflict group, ratified by 14 day lazy consensus. The member facing removal cannot block it. If someone else objects it goes to a 3/4 vote. - If safety is an issue the conflict group can make a preliminary removal. - Conflict group members rotate every 6 months, recuse themselves when they have a conflict of interest and can be recalled. - Joining the conflict group or a higher level working group needs consent from everyone already in it through a 14 day lazy consensus. ## Values Our shared values are still an open question. We will hold a workshop to align on them within the first two months. ## How this passes This takes effect if nobody objects within 14 days. The full draft and the list of open questions are here: [link] ```

inference-bot commented

2026-10-02 22:11:49 +00:00

Draft: Next-stage Charter (for discussion)

A synthesis of the kickoff conversation, this thread, and Dani's interim-policies draft. This is a proposal to react to — not adopted language. It deliberately leaves the current charter.md untouched until members consent to it.

What this is

A governance charter for the Inference Cooperative, designed for the transition at ~50 members. It is not a legal document (bylaws are separate). It separates three things that are easy to tangle:

Governance — who decides: all members, by consent.
Operations — who does the work: open volunteers in working groups.
Accountability — how we see and contest what happens: publication + consent review.

The aim is a model that is participatory and accountable without "death by community committee," and that keeps the door to contribution open while keeping power visible.

Values

Our shared values are an open question. We commit to holding a values workshop within the first two months of this charter taking effect, and to recording the result here. (Education and learning-by-doing are named principles of the cooperative; "always have an active experiment or challenge" is a proposed cultural norm.)

Membership

Members are dues-paying users. They vote.
Institutional / federated partners give us resources (compute, data, money, reach) and receive access and credibility in return. They do not vote. This keeps our one-member-one-voice principle intact while welcoming the federated partners the co-op wants to work with.
Membership lapses when dues lapse, absent a special dispensation.

Decision-making: consent

Any member may propose a decision. It stays open for 14 days. If no member raises a reasoned objection, it becomes policy.
One objection stops a proposal. The proposer may revise and try again.
A proposal that fails three times may go to a 3/4 vote of all members. Before that vote, the conflict group decides whether the issue is worth the cost to our culture.
Tooling and infrastructure decisions use this same process.
We explicitly reject weighted voting (by tenure, contribution, or otherwise). One member, one voice. Naming this is deliberate, not incidental.

Working groups (do-ocracy, horizontal)

A working group is consented into existence by a single proposal stating its remit, membership, and budget. It may also be dissolved the same way.
Inside a group, work is open: any member may volunteer; labor is never voted on. Groups pay volunteers from their consented budget, and all spending is published.
No lead, no boss. Groups are horizontal. A rotating secretary keeps minutes and serves as the point of contact for coordination; the secretary routes decisions to the group and decides nothing alone.
A group's core obligation is publication: its members, minutes, activities, and spend are visible to all members. This — not elections and not a leader — is the mechanism that makes power visible and contestable.
Any member (or a small threshold, e.g. 3–5 signatures) may trigger a consent review of a group. A group that cannot account for itself may be dissolved or re-chartered.

Coordination: delegates and a spokescouncil

A group may elect a delegate (recallable by its own group, carrying a mandate, never personal authority) when it needs to coordinate with other groups.
When cross-group coordination becomes recurring, delegates convene a spokescouncil. It is a coordination body, not a governing one: it holds no authority over a circle's internal domain, and it inherits the same publication and review obligations as any group.
At our current size the all-members assembly is the general circle, so a formal spokescouncil is premature — but the pattern is named here so it is available when growth demands it, without pre-building a board we don't yet need.
Coordination happens in the open (a dedicated Matrix room), so the record is the minutes.

Conflict

Conflicts are managed, not resolved. People try to work it out directly first.
A conflict group of up to 7 facilitators/specialists (ideally including an attorney) helps when that fails, and writes a management plan.
Removing a member takes a proposal from the conflict group, ratified by 14-day lazy consensus. The member facing removal cannot block it; if another member objects, it goes to a 3/4 vote. For safety issues the conflict group may make a preliminary removal.
Conflict-group members rotate every 6 months, recuse on conflicts of interest, and are recallable. Joining the conflict group (or a higher-level group) requires consent from those already in it.

Labor & compensation

Work is voluntary and open. Compensation (stipends, retainers, reimbursements) is paid from a group's consented budget and is published.
A proposal has been floated for a compute/token-allocation mechanism that budgets the co-op's monthly compute toward agreed outcomes. This is a product/pricing design question, not governance — it lives in open-questions.md, not here.

The "super-governor" risk

The co-op must not be able to move only as fast as its technical team, nor let skilled maintainers accrue unaccountable power. The answer is publication, not hierarchy: everything a group does is visible, and any member can trigger a review. A maintainer accruing power is fine; a maintainer doing so invisibly is the failure this charter guards against.

Transition at 50 members

Until 50 members, Nathan (as interim General Manager) may veto any decision. This is a temporary hold, not a permanent power.
The transition to full member governance is staged, not a cliff: working groups and their first memberships are consented before the threshold, so the switch is already running when it trips.
At 50 members, synchronous consensus becomes impractical; the charter notes a quorum (e.g. 30% participation for ordinary proposals, higher for governance changes) and a constitutional/ordinary split (a supermajority, e.g. 75%, to change the governance model itself; ordinary consent for everything else). These protect whichever model we adopt from casual reversal.

How this passes

This takes effect if nobody objects within 14 days. The full draft and the list of open questions live in the docs repository.

# Draft: Next-stage Charter (for discussion) *A synthesis of the kickoff conversation, this thread, and Dani's interim-policies draft. This is a proposal to react to — not adopted language. It deliberately leaves the current `charter.md` untouched until members consent to it.* --- ## What this is A governance charter for the Inference Cooperative, designed for the transition at ~50 members. It is **not** a legal document (bylaws are separate). It separates three things that are easy to tangle: - **Governance** — who decides: all members, by consent. - **Operations** — who does the work: open volunteers in working groups. - **Accountability** — how we see and contest what happens: publication + consent review. The aim is a model that is participatory and accountable *without* "death by community committee," and that keeps the door to contribution open while keeping power visible. --- ## Values Our shared values are an open question. We commit to holding a **values workshop within the first two months** of this charter taking effect, and to recording the result here. (Education and learning-by-doing are named principles of the cooperative; "always have an active experiment or challenge" is a proposed cultural norm.) ## Membership - **Members** are dues-paying users. They vote. - **Institutional / federated partners** give us resources (compute, data, money, reach) and receive access and credibility in return. They do **not** vote. This keeps our one-member-one-voice principle intact while welcoming the federated partners the co-op wants to work with. - Membership lapses when dues lapse, absent a special dispensation. ## Decision-making: consent - Any member may propose a decision. It stays open for **14 days**. If no member raises a reasoned objection, it becomes policy. - One objection stops a proposal. The proposer may revise and try again. - A proposal that fails **three times** may go to a **3/4 vote of all members**. Before that vote, the conflict group decides whether the issue is worth the cost to our culture. - **Tooling and infrastructure decisions use this same process.** - We explicitly **reject weighted voting** (by tenure, contribution, or otherwise). One member, one voice. Naming this is deliberate, not incidental. ## Working groups (do-ocracy, horizontal) - A working group is **consented into existence** by a single proposal stating its **remit, membership, and budget**. It may also be dissolved the same way. - Inside a group, work is **open**: any member may volunteer; labor is never voted on. Groups pay volunteers from their consented budget, and all spending is **published**. - **No lead, no boss.** Groups are horizontal. A rotating **secretary** keeps minutes and serves as the point of contact for coordination; the secretary routes decisions to the group and decides nothing alone. - A group's core obligation is **publication**: its members, minutes, activities, and spend are visible to all members. This — not elections and not a leader — is the mechanism that makes power visible and contestable. - Any member (or a small threshold, e.g. 3–5 signatures) may trigger a **consent review** of a group. A group that cannot account for itself may be dissolved or re-chartered. ### Coordination: delegates and a spokescouncil - A group may elect a **delegate** (recallable by its own group, carrying a mandate, never personal authority) when it needs to coordinate with other groups. - When cross-group coordination becomes recurring, delegates convene a **spokescouncil**. It is a **coordination** body, not a governing one: it holds no authority over a circle's internal domain, and it inherits the same publication and review obligations as any group. - At our current size the **all-members assembly is the general circle**, so a formal spokescouncil is premature — but the pattern is named here so it is available when growth demands it, without pre-building a board we don't yet need. - Coordination happens in the open (a dedicated Matrix room), so the record *is* the minutes. ## Conflict - Conflicts are managed, not resolved. People try to work it out directly first. - A **conflict group** of up to 7 facilitators/specialists (ideally including an attorney) helps when that fails, and writes a management plan. - **Removing a member** takes a proposal from the conflict group, ratified by 14-day lazy consensus. The member facing removal cannot block it; if another member objects, it goes to a 3/4 vote. For safety issues the conflict group may make a preliminary removal. - Conflict-group members rotate every 6 months, recuse on conflicts of interest, and are recallable. Joining the conflict group (or a higher-level group) requires consent from those already in it. ## Labor & compensation - Work is voluntary and open. Compensation (stipends, retainers, reimbursements) is paid from a group's consented budget and is **published**. - A proposal has been floated for a **compute/token-allocation mechanism** that budgets the co-op's monthly compute toward agreed outcomes. This is a product/pricing design question, not governance — it lives in `open-questions.md`, not here. ## The "super-governor" risk The co-op must not be able to move only as fast as its technical team, nor let skilled maintainers accrue unaccountable power. The answer is **publication, not hierarchy**: everything a group does is visible, and any member can trigger a review. A maintainer accruing power is fine; a maintainer doing so *invisibly* is the failure this charter guards against. ## Transition at 50 members - Until 50 members, Nathan (as interim General Manager) may veto any decision. This is a **temporary hold**, not a permanent power. - The transition to full member governance is **staged, not a cliff**: working groups and their first memberships are consented *before* the threshold, so the switch is already running when it trips. - At 50 members, synchronous consensus becomes impractical; the charter notes a **quorum** (e.g. 30% participation for ordinary proposals, higher for governance changes) and a **constitutional/ordinary split** (a supermajority, e.g. 75%, to change the governance model itself; ordinary consent for everything else). These protect whichever model we adopt from casual reversal. --- ## How this passes This takes effect if nobody objects within **14 days**. The full draft and the list of open questions live in the docs repository.

ntnsndr commented

2026-10-02 22:21:01 +00:00

A couple thoughts:

I could imagine organizational members having a vote and voice, even if it is not outsized. MayFirst.coop actually gives institutional members 2 votes, which is still quite low given their high engagement.
Spokescouncil members should be selected and rotating, not elected. It's not a representative body but a coordination body.
Conflict should also be clarified to include things like Code of Conduct violations
It might be worth distinguishing between an "objection" and a "block"; usually in consent processes, a block prevents passage but an objection is an invitation for modification and improvement.

To be clear, this has not been formally proposed. That would happen in the forum.

A couple thoughts: * I could imagine organizational members having a vote and voice, even if it is not outsized. MayFirst.coop actually gives institutional members 2 votes, which is still quite low given their high engagement. * Spokescouncil members should be selected and rotating, not elected. It's not a representative body but a coordination body. * Conflict should also be clarified to include things like Code of Conduct violations * It might be worth distinguishing between an "objection" and a "block"; usually in consent processes, a block prevents passage but an objection is an invitation for modification and improvement. To be clear, this has not been formally proposed. That would happen in the forum.

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Reference: co-op/support#9