diff --git a/operations/agentic-systems.md b/operations/agentic-systems.md index aecedfc..20316e3 100644 --- a/operations/agentic-systems.md +++ b/operations/agentic-systems.md @@ -19,6 +19,24 @@ This page is for members who read its output or give it instructions. hyphen) no longer holds an access token; some historical references and old room roles still carry the name. +## Who can do what on the host + +Each agent runs as its own Unix account, and the accounts are ranked: + +- **The bots** (`infrastructure-bot`, `socialbot`, `designbot` and any future + working-group bot) cannot use `sudo` at all. +- **Inferencebot, the steward,** can act inside those bot accounts — it is the + fleet administrator — but it has **no root** and no passwordless `sudo` beyond + the docs and backup service commands. It cannot install packages, create users, + edit `/etc`, or open a root shell. +- **Root belongs to a person.** A separate operator account, reached with an SSH + key and never a password, holds full `sudo`. Root SSH login stays closed: the + operator signs in as their own account and escalates deliberately. + +That split is deliberate. An agent compromise reaches the bot accounts and the +co-op plumbing, not the host. Host-level actions stay attributable to a human, +and automation cannot quietly widen its own privileges. + ## What to ask for - Operational work that a runbook already describes, or that ends in a PR, an @@ -57,8 +75,9 @@ operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation. the chat: confirmed before they deploy. - Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets. - Minting or rotating credentials. -- Host root actions outside the docs/backup service allowlist: package installs, - user management, and arbitrary root commands. +- Host root actions — package installs, user management, sudoers changes, and + arbitrary root commands. These run only through the operator's key-only + account; the steward cannot perform them. - Anything a runbook marks "confirm". This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter diff --git a/operations/infrastructure.md b/operations/infrastructure.md index 7f7244c..1e1a005 100644 --- a/operations/infrastructure.md +++ b/operations/infrastructure.md @@ -38,13 +38,19 @@ and deliberately kept apart from the member-facing applications. The steward bot — the automation behind the digests and the newsletter drafts — and the co-op's other agents live there. Keeping them on their own host means an agent problem stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data. +Access to that host is SSH-key only — no agent or bot account has a password. +The steward can act inside the bot accounts it maintains but cannot take root; +root is a separate human operator account, so host-level changes stay with a +person. ### Backups Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade or a lost server can be restored. The automation host keeps its own encrypted -backup as well, with credentials kept apart from the agent's environment. +backup as well, with credentials kept apart from the agent's environment. That +backup runs as root from a root-owned script, so the agent can trigger it but +cannot alter the backup code or read the backup keys. ### Domain and DNS @@ -215,8 +221,10 @@ private, loopback, and internal addresses. The independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope. - **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's environment, never in the repos. -- **Least-privilege automation.** The steward agent runs as its own Unix user; - host-level actions that need root are operator-controlled. +- **Least-privilege automation.** Every agent runs as its own Unix user; bots have + no `sudo`, the steward can act only within the bot accounts it maintains, and + root belongs to a separate key-only operator account. Host-level changes are + therefore deliberate human actions, not automation. - **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is