docs: document the host access model
State the privilege ranking on the Agentic Systems page: bots have no sudo, the steward can act only inside bot accounts, and root belongs to a separate key-only operator account. Update the Infrastructure page's least-privilege and backup statements to match.
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@@ -19,6 +19,24 @@ This page is for members who read its output or give it instructions.
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hyphen) no longer holds an access token; some historical references and old
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hyphen) no longer holds an access token; some historical references and old
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room roles still carry the name.
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room roles still carry the name.
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## Who can do what on the host
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Each agent runs as its own Unix account, and the accounts are ranked:
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- **The bots** (`infrastructure-bot`, `socialbot`, `designbot` and any future
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working-group bot) cannot use `sudo` at all.
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- **Inferencebot, the steward,** can act inside those bot accounts — it is the
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fleet administrator — but it has **no root** and no passwordless `sudo` beyond
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the docs and backup service commands. It cannot install packages, create users,
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edit `/etc`, or open a root shell.
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- **Root belongs to a person.** A separate operator account, reached with an SSH
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key and never a password, holds full `sudo`. Root SSH login stays closed: the
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operator signs in as their own account and escalates deliberately.
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That split is deliberate. An agent compromise reaches the bot accounts and the
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co-op plumbing, not the host. Host-level actions stay attributable to a human,
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and automation cannot quietly widen its own privileges.
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## What to ask for
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## What to ask for
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- Operational work that a runbook already describes, or that ends in a PR, an
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- Operational work that a runbook already describes, or that ends in a PR, an
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@@ -57,8 +75,9 @@ operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation.
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the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
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the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
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- Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
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- Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
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- Minting or rotating credentials.
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- Minting or rotating credentials.
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- Host root actions outside the docs/backup service allowlist: package installs,
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- Host root actions — package installs, user management, sudoers changes, and
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user management, and arbitrary root commands.
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arbitrary root commands. These run only through the operator's key-only
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account; the steward cannot perform them.
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- Anything a runbook marks "confirm".
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- Anything a runbook marks "confirm".
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This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter
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This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter
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@@ -38,13 +38,19 @@ and deliberately kept apart from the member-facing applications. The steward bot
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— the automation behind the digests and the newsletter drafts — and the co-op's
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— the automation behind the digests and the newsletter drafts — and the co-op's
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other agents live there. Keeping them on their own host means an agent problem
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other agents live there. Keeping them on their own host means an agent problem
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stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data.
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stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data.
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Access to that host is SSH-key only — no agent or bot account has a password.
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The steward can act inside the bot accounts it maintains but cannot take root;
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root is a separate human operator account, so host-level changes stay with a
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person.
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### Backups
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### Backups
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Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in
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Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in
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Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade
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Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade
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or a lost server can be restored. The automation host keeps its own encrypted
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or a lost server can be restored. The automation host keeps its own encrypted
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backup as well, with credentials kept apart from the agent's environment.
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backup as well, with credentials kept apart from the agent's environment. That
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backup runs as root from a root-owned script, so the agent can trigger it but
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cannot alter the backup code or read the backup keys.
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### Domain and DNS
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### Domain and DNS
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@@ -215,8 +221,10 @@ private, loopback, and internal addresses. The
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independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope.
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independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope.
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- **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's
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- **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's
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environment, never in the repos.
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environment, never in the repos.
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- **Least-privilege automation.** The steward agent runs as its own Unix user;
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- **Least-privilege automation.** Every agent runs as its own Unix user; bots have
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host-level actions that need root are operator-controlled.
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no `sudo`, the steward can act only within the bot accounts it maintains, and
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root belongs to a separate key-only operator account. Host-level changes are
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therefore deliberate human actions, not automation.
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- **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in
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- **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in
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the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay
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the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay
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publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is
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publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is
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