docs: reflect restricted host access, signed key feed, backup versioning, advisory CI

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inference-admin committed 2026-11-20 02:10:58 +00:00
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@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ operator can stop a deploy; anything irreversible waits for confirmation.
the chat: confirmed before they deploy.
- Changing the model catalog, prices or budgets.
- Minting or rotating credentials.
- Host root actions outside the docs/backup service allowlist: package installs,
user management, and arbitrary root commands.
- Anything a runbook marks "confirm".
This matches the standing policy the agents operate under today. A stricter
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@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ stays an agent problem: it cannot reach the chat, the gateway or member data.
Cloudron writes **encrypted** backups to Infomaniak's object storage in
Switzerland every night and keeps the last **seven days**, so a failed upgrade
or a lost server can be restored. The automation host backs up its own data to
the same object storage.
the same object storage; its backup credentials are root-only and never held by
the agent. Bucket versioning is enabled, so a deleted snapshot object remains
recoverable rather than vanishing.
### Domain and DNS
@@ -215,10 +217,23 @@ private, loopback, and internal addresses. The
independent and independently rotatable, so a leak has bounded scope.
- **No secrets in version control.** Credentials live in the hosting platform's
environment, never in the repos.
- **Least-privilege automation.** The steward agent runs as its own Unix user.
Host root access is limited to a small allowlist of docs and backup service
commands; package installs, user management and arbitrary root commands need
the operator.
- **Backup keys stay outside the agent.** The nightly backup credentials live in
a root-only file, not the agent's environment.
- **Machine feeds are signed.** The portal's chat-key feed is reachable only
from the internal network and requires a timestamped HMAC in addition to its
sync token.
- **CI is advisory, not a trust boundary.** Woodpecker runs in a shared root
container, so its status is visible but does not gate merges; Owners review is
the gate. The operator docs record the runner-isolation work.
- **Accepted trade-offs** (documented, not hidden): member keys are stored in
the portal database so the co-op can serve them, and the API gateway must stay
publicly reachable. Its admin surfaces are disabled; only the public API is
exposed.
exposed. The automation host's remaining backup-timer root hardening is
tracked in operator docs.
## For operators